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Contact tracing apps for the COVID-19 
pandemic: a systematic literature review 
of challenges and future directions 
for neo-liberal societies
Alex Akinbi1* , Mark Forshaw2  and Victoria Blinkhorn2  
Abstract 
Purpose: The COVID-19 pandemic has spread with increased fatalities around the world and has become an inter-
national public health crisis. Public health authorities in many countries have introduced contact tracing apps to track 
and trace infected persons as part of measures to contain the spread of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome-Coro-
navirus 2. However, there are major concerns about its efficacy and privacy which affects mass acceptance amongst a 
population. This systematic literature review encompasses the current challenges facing this technology and recom-
mendations to address such challenges in the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic in neo-liberal societies.
Methods: The systematic literature review was conducted by searching databases of Google Scholar, Web of Science, 
PubMed, IEEE Xplore Digital Library, PsycInfo and ScienceDirect using the search terms (“Contact Tracing” OR “Contact 
Tracing apps”) AND (“COVID-19” OR “Coronavirus”) to identify relevant literature. The searches were run against the title, 
keywords, or abstract, depending on the search platforms. The searches were conducted between January 1, 2020, 
through 31st January 2021. Further inputs were also taken from preprints, published government and technical reports. 
We explore and discuss from the selected literature, the key challenges and issues that influence unwillingness to use 
these contact tracing apps in neo-liberal societies which include the plausibility of abuse of user privacy rights and lack 
of trust in the government and public health authorities by their citizens. Other challenges identified and discussed 
include ethical issues, security vulnerabilities, user behaviour and participation, and technical constraints.
Results and conclusion: Finally, in the analysis of this systematic literature review, recommendations to address 
these challenges, future directions, and considerations in the use of digital contact tracing apps and related technolo-
gies to contain the spread of future pandemic outbreaks are presented. For policy makers in neo-liberal societies, this 
study provides an in-depth review of issues that must be addressed. We highlight recommendations to improve the 
willingness to use such digital technologies and could facilitate mass acceptance amongst users.
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leading to a worldwide pandemic. In the fall of 2020, new 
mutations and variants of this disease detected in the 
U.K and South Africa, B.1.1.7 and B.1.351 respectively, 
have since emerged and are circulating globally [1]. In 
response to the rapidly growing number of cases and the 
danger of overburdening health systems, many countries 
have resulted in lockdowns to slow the spread of the novel 
coronavirus [2]. Other strategies including mass test-
ing and manual contact tracing (using humans or health 
Health Information Science 
and Systems
*Correspondence:  o.a.akinbi@ljmu.ac.uk
1 School of Computer Science and Mathematics, Liverpool John Moores 
University, James Parsons Building, Liverpool, UK
Full list of author information is available at the end of the article
Introduction
The novel COVID-19 disease caused by severe acute 
respiratory syndrome–coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) has 
rapidly spread with increased fatalities across the world 
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professionals to collect data) have been deployed to con-
tain the disease and to help ease lockdown restrictions. 
Like previous similar outbreaks such as Severe Acute 
Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and Middle East Res-
piratory Syndrome (MERS), manual contact tracing and 
follow-up control measures such as quarantine and isola-
tion were crucially important and successful during these 
outbreaks [3–6]. Although SARS and MERS were both 
considered as “fast-course” infectious diseases given their 
relatively short infectious period, the rate of infection and 
transmission of the SARS-Cov-2 virus is much faster and 
the death rate outweighs both SARS and MERS which on 
the scale makes manual contact tracing response labour-
intensive, slow and imperfect [7]. One weakness of the 
manual contact tracing method is that it greatly relies 
on whether the confirmed cases can recollect who they 
met in the places where they have been or are willing to 
voluntarily disclose such information. Moreover, there is 
evidence that SARS-CoV-2 has a reproduction number of 
around 2–3 in the early stages of an outbreak and many 
infections can occur without symptoms which are higher 
than that for SARS (1.7–1.9) and MERS (< 1), suggesting 
that SARS-CoV-2 has a higher pandemic potential which 
requires a different approach [8–13].
Hence, new technology-based methods have been con-
sidered to fill the gap in the identification of contacts, 
especially if case detection is aggressive [14, 15]. Public 
health authorities and governments have responded by 
building digital contact tracing mobile apps like the ones 
initiated in Singapore, South Korea, and China to keep 
track of meetings between individuals which allow self-
isolation instructions to be sent automatically to every-
one when a newly diagnosed patient has interacted with 
them while infectious with the SARS-CoV-2 virus. Also, 
Apple and Google in a joint effort to assist announced a 
new technology for third-party apps on iOS and Android 
devices to support public health authorities around the 
world in developing digital contact tracing apps [16]. The 
concept relies on Bluetooth low-energy (BLE) beaconing 
technology to record when a phone has come into close-
proximity with anyone else using the app to track and 
trace infections. Considering Google Android and Apple 
iOS jointly hold the highest market share of smartphone 
operating systems, it seems likely that their approach will 
be critical in how the majority of contact-tracing apps 
will function [17]. Although Apple and Google claim user 
privacy and security are at the core of the design, privacy 
concerns have also been raised noting that contact trac-
ing apps can otherwise be repurposed to enable unwar-
ranted discrimination and surveillance by governments 
on their citizens, or data harvesting by third parties [18].
This has created trust issues in the acceptance and 
participation of users to download and use such apps 
especially in neo-liberal societies where their use is not 
mandatory, hence defeating the real purpose of digital 
contact tracing. For contact tracing apps to be effective, 
roughly 50% to 70% of a population needs to use them 
[19] and scientific and epidemiological evidence sug-
gest contact tracing apps have the potential to contrib-
ute to reducing the suffering caused by the pandemic 
and ease lockdown [20]. Strong support for the apps in 
online surveys carried out in neo-liberal countries like 
France, Germany, Italy, the UK, and the US, shows that 
the willingness to install contact tracing apps is very high 
[21]. However, this does not equate to people doing so. 
Recent studies show that these apps are not being used 
by enough of the population in countries including India, 
Norway, Singapore, and Iceland [22].
In a survey from the Washington Post and the Uni-
versity of Maryland, USA, respondents were split evenly 
(50–50%) on whether they will use a contact tracing 
app if one was made available. Of the 50% of respond-
ents who said they will use it, only 17% said they would 
use it compared to 32% who said they will probably use 
it [23]. Despite the threshold set between 50 and 70% of 
the population’s use of the app to make it effective, recent 
statistics from countries where contact tracing apps 
are voluntary are not promising. At the time of writing, 
about one million people (20% of the population) have 
downloaded Singapore’s contact-tracing app ‘Trace-
Together’ with 16% of the population currently being 
active users. Australia’s COVIDSafe app has been down-
loaded 6 million times based on data from the Google 
Play Store (4% of the population) and so far, just one per-
son has been reported to have been identified using data 
from it. Similarly, the French contact tracing app ‘Stop-
Covid’ with 1.9 million downloads from both the App 
Store and Play Store only managed to send 14 notifica-
tions since its release (at the time of this writing). Recent 
data from the app developers in the first 3 weeks since 
its release show from the 1.9 million downloads, 23,953 
people deactivated the app while 460,000 people simply 
uninstalled the app without apparent reasons. The effec-
tiveness of contact tracing apps to track and trace indi-
viduals infected with the novel SARS-Cov-2 virus has 
also been met with scepticism both by industry experts 
and academics in western democracies. Technical, pri-
vacy and security problems have hampered the apps and 
their impact on the COVID-19 pandemic remain uncer-
tain [24, 25].
Considering the above, we conducted a systematic lit-
erature review (SLR) of the current challenges and appli-
cation of contact tracing apps in the fight against the 
COVID-19 pandemic. The aims of this study and the 
main contributions are as follows:
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• Provide an up to date review on the current challenges 
of contact tracing apps in the fight against COVID-
19 in neo-liberal societies.
• Discuss recommendations to address these challenges.
• Explore future directions and considerations in the use 
of digital contact tracing technologies in the fight 
against future infectious disease outbreaks.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In 
“Mandatory application of contact tracing apps in East 
Asia” section, we discuss the mandatory application of 
contact tracing apps for the COVID-19 pandemic in East 
Asia. In “Research Methodology” section, we describe 
the research methodology used for this study. Results 
from the systematic literature review are presented in 
“Results” section. In “Discussion of results” section, we 
discuss findings from the results of the study; highlight 
some of the key challenges; recommendations and iden-
tify future directions for contact tracing technology. 
Finally, in “Conclusion and future work” section, we con-
clude the paper and highlight potential areas for future 
research and investigation.
Mandatory application of contact tracing apps 
in East Asia
Contact tracing apps can greatly support testing, trac-
ing, isolating, and quarantine measures in the attempt 
to mitigate and slow the spread of the SARS-Cov-2 virus 
by speeding up processes of reporting and contact trac-
ing through improved digital data flow, proximity trac-
ing and geolocation tracking [26]. It could play a pivotal 
role given the ubiquity of internet-connected devices and 
increase the speed of surveillance of a large population 
of smartphone users in almost real-time to know where 
the infection hotspots are. As lockdown measures are 
gradually being lifted in many countries, contact trac-
ing apps are central to control strategies during the de-
escalation of social distancing [27]. It can also be crucial 
in flagging more infections especially in scenarios where 
manual contact tracing cannot. For example, a yet-to-be 
diagnosed person has the SARS-Cov-2 virus and takes a 
crowded bus to work; manual contact tracing is unlikely 
to identify everyone on the bus standing close to the 
infected person. Indeed, a study by Kucharski [28] found 
that combined testing and contact tracing strategies sig-
nificantly reduced the reproductive number more than 
mass testing or self-isolation alone.
In East Asian countries such as China and especially 
Taiwan, contact tracing apps have been mandatory and 
proved effective alongside manual contact tracing meth-
ods in identifying new cases since the end of lockdown 
[25, 29, 30]. The apps generally work by assigning a col-
our code (green, yellow, or red) using an algorithmic 
assessment of the user’s travel history and health status. 
People who can show a green health code on their smart-
phones demonstrate they have not been in contact with 
a confirmed case of COVID-19 [31–33]. In South Korea, 
contact tracing apps such as the ‘Corona 100’ seems to be 
popular and has enabled public health officials to reduce 
the time needed to trace a patient’s movements from 
around 24  h to approximately 10  min and thus, helped 
the general public avoid infectious areas.
South Korea’s extensive contact tracing, testing, and 
isolation measures received overwhelming support from 
the population and have helped to reduce the virus’s 
spread [34]. Laws passed and data transparency dur-
ing the MERS outbreak in 2015 allows the South Korean 
government to collect and publish public data including 
travel histories of confirmed patients. Hence, the privacy 
of the population has been given up to the government 
especially in response to public health safety. To ensure 
people under compulsory home quarantines do not 
stray from the confines of their apartments, the Hong 
Kong government required compulsory download of the 
‘StayHomeSafe’  app and provided geofencing electronic 
tracker wristbands that alert authorities if they violated 
quarantines. These approaches have significantly contrib-
uted to the mass acceptance of contact tracing apps so far 
in the region.
There is little evidence to suggest that the use of these 
types of approaches adopted in East Asian countries 
might be successfully transferable to neo-liberal societies 
such as the USA, UK, France, Germany etc. with different 
political and cultural systems. Controversies about the 
legitimacy of these apps have largely focused on issues 
of privacy and surveillance as commentators empha-
sized the differences between populations in East Asia’s 
acceptance of state surveillance and a European scepti-
cism towards this practice [35]. The barrier appears to be 
that many of these countries especially in Europe are very 
sensitive to privacy issues and privacy is protected by law 
like the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [36, 
37]. A study by Hernandez-Orallo [38] shows that for 
possible second waves of infection, contact tracing apps 
can be effective in controlling the SARS-Cov-2 virus, 
assuming that a percentage of the population will have 
gained immunity, or implemented in combination with 
some other lenient measures, such as social distancing. 
Moreover, for many of such countries that are resum-
ing business operations and social activities, or where 
protests are happening and the number of social con-
tacts increases, it will be worthwhile for them to invest 
in strategies to vastly improve the mass acceptance of 
contact-tracing apps to enable rapid response to a resur-
gence of the SARS-Cov-2 virus [39]. However, the appar-
ent dilemma faced by neo-liberal governments is making 
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a conscious choice between privacy and public health 
whilst showing the efficacy of such apps.
Research methodology
The systematic literature review (SLR) was conducted 
by searching databases of Google Scholar, Web of Sci-
ence, PubMed, IEEE Xplore Digital Library, PsycInfo and 
ScienceDirect using the search terms (“Contact Trac-
ing” OR “Contact Tracing apps”) AND (“COVID-19” OR 
“Coronavirus”) to identify relevant literature. The search 
strings were run against the title, keywords, and abstract, 
depending on the search platforms. The searches were 
conducted between January 1, 2020, through January 
31, 2021. Further inputs were also taken from relevant 
preprints, published government and technical reports. 
Previous studies [40–45] have used similar methods to 
conduct an SLR. To achieve the objectives of extensively 
reviewing the most relevant studies and answering the 
research questions. We conducted the SLR under the 
guidance published by Kitchenham and Charters [46]. 
According to Kitchenham and Charters, a Systematic Lit-
erature Review is “a form of secondary study that uses a 
well-defined methodology to identify, analyse and inter-
pret all available evidence related to a specific research 
question in a way that is unbiased and repeatable” [46]. 
The SLR allows us to implement the three phases of plan-
ning the review, conducting the review, and reporting or 
documenting the review. Each phase of the SLR is out-
lined below:
Planning the review involves the following steps:
• Identification of the need for an extensive literature 
review
• Formulating the research questions (RQ1 to RQ3)
• Development of search strategy (this involves using 
search strings, sources selection, search processes 
and documenting search strategy).
Conducting the review involves the following steps:
• Selection of relevant publications (Inclusion and Exclu-
sion Criteria)
• Evaluation and assessment of selected relevant publi-
cations
• Data extraction and synthesis-to address the research 
questions (RQ1 to RQ3).
Reporting the review (Documentation) involves the fol-
lowing steps:
• Presentation of results
• Discussion of findings based on the research questions 
(RQ1 to RQ3).
The phases of the SLR adopted to conduct this research 
is presented in Fig. 1.
Planning the review
The purpose of this SLR is to analyse current and existing 
studies and their findings and to summarize the current 
challenges in the application of contact tracing apps in 
the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic in neo-liberal 
societies. To make sure our study is focused, we devel-
oped three research questions as follows.
1. What are the current challenges facing the efficacy 
and mass acceptance of contact tracing apps for 
COVID-19 in neo-liberal societies?
2. What recommendations can be implemented to 
address these challenges and improve mass accept-
ance?
3. What are the future directions and considerations in 
the use of digital contact tracing technologies in the 
fight against future pandemic outbreaks?
The study complements existing studies by conduct-
ing an SLR to identify the pressing challenges related to 
the adoption of contact tracing apps in the fight against 
COVID-19, a global pandemic that has claimed a signif-
icant number of human lives and caused major disrup-
tions to business, led to social isolation and modified 
Fig. 1 Phases of the Systematic Literature Review (SLR)
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human relations in neo-liberal societies up to January 
2021. It provides an up to date study and the current state 
of contact tracing apps in containing the spread of this 
deadly infectious disease. The study aims to present gov-
ernments and policymakers with the challenges they face 
and discuss strategies they need to consider if the popu-
lation are to adopt the use of contact tracing apps now 
and similar contact tracing technologies in future pan-
demic outbreaks.
Conducting the review
These searched were conducted on the 31st of January 
2021. A total of 18,566 results were returned from the 
initial searches carried out using the search strings and 
keywords on the online digital databases. These results 
included a combination of peer-reviewed publications, 
preprints, and reports from credible sources. The results 
from these searches were filtered through the inclusion/
exclusion criteria to remove irrelevant and duplicate pub-
lications. Moreover, we implemented forward and back-
ward snowballing iterations [47] to ensure that all the 
selected publications were relevant and met the inclusion 
criteria. These inclusion criteria were:
• Selected publications must be relevant to contact trac-
ing technology and its application in the fight against 
the COVID-19 pandemic.
• Publications must be related to the research questions 
(RQ1 to RQ3).
• Publications must be written in English.
The exclusion criteria, on the other hand, were:
• Publications not relevant to contact tracing technology 
and its application in the fight against the COVID-19 
pandemic.
• Duplication of published sources, news articles and lit-
erature not written in English.
Since an SLR is about conducting a comprehensive 
search of all relevant sources related to the research 
topic, further checks using a quality assessment was 
applied for a more rigorous result. A detailed assess-
ment of the selected publications was done based on 
the checklist as set by Kitchenham and Charters [46] to 
determine their relevance and suitability for addition to 
the SLR. The quality assessment was based on the pri-
mary goal of the selected publication, context, and rel-
evance to the stated research questions RQ1 to RQ3. 
We selected 5 publications at random and used the fol-
lowing quality assessment check for the final selection 
of publications. The publication must meet at least one 
or more following.
1. Contact Tracing Apps. The publication must include 
discussion and application of contact tracing apps in 
the fight against COVID-19.
2. Context. The content of the publication consists 
of relevant details which explain the objectives and 
findings.
3. Challenges of Contact Tracing Apps. The publica-
tion consists of some significant details on the chal-
lenges of digital contact tracing apps in the fight 
against COVID-19 to address RQ1.
4. Recommendations. The publication includes some 
recommendations to address challenges of digital 
contact tracing or the use of contact tracing apps in 
the fight against COVID-19 to address RQ2.
5. Future Considerations. The publication discusses 
future considerations in the implication or use of 
digital contact tracing technology in the fight against 
future pandemics to address RQ3.
With this process, 17,959 publications were excluded 
from the initial search results, bringing the total num-
ber down to 610 publications. Following that, the exclu-
sion criteria based on titles, abstract and content was 
implemented; and as a result, 538 publications were 
also excluded altogether, bringing the number down to 
72 relevant publications. Finally, 61 publications were 
identified as the final set of primary studies for this SLR 
after the quality assessment selection. Figure  2 shows 
the number of publications selected and excluded at 
each stage of the process. The data extracted from the 
collection of relevant publications were used to provide 
answers to the research questions RQ1 to RQ3 in line 
with the objectives of this study. The data extraction and 
synthesis for the final publications are described and cat-
egorised based on the following categories:
• Context Data: Details about the aim and purpose of 
the study.
• Qualitative data: Findings and conclusions from the 
relevant study.
• Quantitative data: Results from extracted data, dis-
cussions, and findings from the relevant study.
Results
Each publication from the final set of 61 primary studies 
was read in full after they passed the quality assessment 
and relevant context data, qualitative and qualitative 
data was extracted. All primary studies are centred on 
the research questions RQ1 to RQ3 and a theme in rela-
tion to the challenges, recommendations and future 
directions of contact tracing apps and related technol-
ogy in the fight against COVID-19 and future pandemic 
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outbreaks. Figure  3 shows the percentages of differ-
ent themes of the 61 primary studies, after the quality 
assessment selection and were included in the analysis 
and discussion of results. Most research outputs con-
sidered in this SLR are published in academic journals. 
Also, there were few outputs published as preprints, 
government, and technical reports.
The themes identified in the primary studies show 
that almost half (45%) of all studies on contact tracing 
apps for the COVID-19 pandemic are concerned with 
user privacy. User behaviour and participation is the 
second most popular theme amongst the primary stud-
ies, with a percentage of 16%. This is followed by ethical 
issues surrounding the use of contact tracing apps in 
12% of the primary studies. Lack of trust in the govern-
ment especially for neo-liberal societies accounts for 
10% of the primary studies. The studies focused on the 
plausibility of contact tracing apps being used for gov-
ernment surveillance as one of the reasons behind the 
unwillingness of the population to use them. Security 
vulnerabilities are the jointly third commonest theme, 
with a proportion of 10%. The last common theme of 
the primary studies is technical constraints that affect 
the adoption of contact tracing apps, which accounts 
for 7%.
Fig. 2 Selection of primary studies for the SLR
Fig. 3 Chart of themes of primary studies
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Discussion of results
The decision to develop and deploy contact tracing apps 
for tracking and tracing the spread of the COVID-19 
pandemic continues to raise data privacy concerns and 
a balance between user data privacy and societal benefit 
has been considered [48]. This coupled with its effective-
ness, ethical considerations, security risks, and technical 
issues has been highlighted as major challenges affecting 
mass acceptance amongst the population in neo-liberal 
societies. In this section, we present findings from the 
selected primary studies that highlight the major chal-
lenges affecting contact tracing apps in the fight against 
COVID-19, recommendations to address these chal-
lenges and future directions in the use of digital contact 
tracing technology to fight future pandemics.
RQ1: what are the current challenges of contact tracing 
apps in neo‑liberal societies?
It is important to state that this systematic literature 
review focuses on the challenges of contact tracing apps 
that influence their wide acceptance and adoption, espe-
cially in neo-liberal societies. However, it is imperative 
to also note that some of the discussion in our find-
ings could apply to other demographics and digital 
applications.
• User data privacy concerns—Parker et  al. [20] high-
lights that justification for privacy infringements of 
users is hypothetically justifiable in cases where con-
tact tracing apps have the potential to contribute to 
the saving of many lives and reduce enormous suf-
fering caused by a blanket population lockdown. 
Hence, people should be prepared to trade-off pri-
vacy encroaching contact tracing apps for civil liberty 
and see it as a public duty to save lives as lockdown 
is being eased. However, an app encroaching on 
people’s privacy while providing little contribution, 
compared to other measures in tackling the spread 
of COVID-19 would be ethically dubious, especially 
in neo-liberal societies [49, 50]. Privacy concerns 
related to user data has been of one the significant 
issue affecting the acceptance and willingness to 
use contact tracing apps as shown in primary stud-
ies [37, 51–60]. Questions such as how user data will 
be anonymized, where the data will be stored, who 
has access to the data, how it will be shared, used and 
destroyed when the pandemic is over have been sub-
jects of huge debate. These are the main reasons that 
influence unwillingness to use these contact tracing 
apps.
• Lack of Trust—The lack of trust in government and 
their motive appears to be a key factor that creates a 
negative effect on people’s decisions to install a con-
tact tracing app on their phones especially in neo-
liberal societies where the use is not mandatory and 
success depends on the establishment of sustained 
and sound public trust and confidence as shown in 
primary studies [21, 61, 62]. Especially in the USA in 
the post 9–11 era, lack of the public’s trust in govern-
ments has been impacted since Edward Snowden’s 
revelations on US government global surveillance 
program.
 Apart from surveillance concerns associated with cen-
tral authorities’ access to user data, concerns asso-
ciated with access to user data by third parties have 
also been raised [60]. These include any individual 
with whom a user has exchanged tokens in the con-
tact tracing app based on some notion of physical 
proximity, big data analysis companies, or malicious 
actors where the contact tracing app’s system is naïve 
or vulnerable to information leakage [53]. In May 
2020, the official COVID-19 contact tracing app for 
the state of North Dakota, USA, was found to send 
user location data and the unique user identifier to 
Foursquare and other data to Google including a 
bug-tracking company with the users’ consent [63].
 A scientific Data Protection Impact Assessment 
(DPIA) of contact  tracing  app  designs (including 
centralized and decentralized models) conducted in 
the primary study [64] found that none of the pro-
posed designs ensures proper anonymization, and 
that informed consent would not be a legitimate 
legal ground for the processing, that data subjects’ 
rights are not sufficiently safeguarded and that no 
design provides for sufficient purpose-binding. Simi-
lar findings in the application of the European Data 
Protection Board (EDPB) guidelines in the assess-
ment of three contact tracing apps (Stopp Corona, 
NHS COVID-19 and TraceTogether), showed vary-
ing compliance with the guidelines criteria [54]. The 
issues highlighted show that maintaining the balance 
between trust in government institutions and public 
health is a huge challenge in the adoption of contact 
tracing apps in the fight against COVID-19.
• Ethical issues—In many countries, residents have been 
living under lockdown with their civil liberties heavily 
curtailed. Many businesses have been forced to stop 
operations forcing millions out of work. According to 
the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) April World 
Economic Outlook, the global growth in 2020 is 
expected to fall to -3% making it the worst recession 
since the Great Depression [65]. The United King-
dom’s economic GDP is projected to fall by 11.5% 
while the USA, China, Germany, and France GDPs 
are predicted to fall by 6.6%, 2.6%, 6.6%, and 11.4% 
respectively [66]. As countries slowly lift restric-
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tions and business open to enable quick economic 
recovery, digital contact tracing itself can contrib-
ute to general fairness risk associated with discrimi-
nate mitigation measures [67]. For example, disad-
vantaged workers are less likely to be able to work 
from home, engaging in work means that they are at 
higher risks of becoming infected and are more likely 
to form social ties with others in similarly precarious 
arrangements. Therefore, they may be forced to quar-
antine simply because they have been in close prox-
imity with others in the same social group although 
they may not be at high risk of infection. The lack of 
smartphones and internet access, as well as the share 
of informal employment all come together to dispro-
portionately impact the low-income communities 
which continue to drive the health divide rooted in 
social status and economic differences even further 
[68, 69].
 Primary studies [64, 70–72], discuss the risk of data 
collected through contact tracing apps by public 
health authorities and governments can be used not 
just for epidemiological studies and surveillance but 
also for behavioural profiling of a population. The 
behavioural profiles if correlated with other demo-
graphic and socio-economic data may motivate 
selective policies in which a population that has been 
measured as being on average more willing to take 
risks are treated differently by future restrictions than 
other groups whose compliance is supposedly higher. 
This raises serious ethical issues as data can be used 
to discriminate against a population or geographic 
locations where cases of COVID-19 are higher. For 
example, behavioural scoring can be used to deter-
mine access to medical resources, funding, treat-
ment, etc. It was discovered that Bahrain’s ‘BeAware 
Bahrain’ app has been sharing data with a national 
television show called Are You at Home? which 
offered prizes to those who stayed at home during 
Ramadan [73]. In South Korea, contact-tracing laws 
permit the government to determine the immigra-
tion status of infected individuals. Sinha and Pater-
son [17] highlight that if such laws exist in the U.S., 
undocumented communities may not seek health-
care and that over time the same technologies and 
laws could be used to track undocumented migrants.
• Security vulnerabilities—Security flaws in the design 
and implementation of contact tracing apps have the 
potential to put sensitive personal details of users at 
risk. A recent investigation by Amnesty Security Lab 
discovered a significant weakness in the configura-
tion of Qatar’s mandatory EHTERAZ contact tracing 
app [74]. The vulnerability could allow hackers access 
to highly sensitive personal information, including 
the name, national ID, health status, and location 
data of more than one million users. Similar vulner-
abilities have been disclosed in India’s Aarogya Setu 
and Pakistan’s Covid-19 Gov PK apps. These vulnera-
bilities were from apps that have been tested by secu-
rity researchers so far. Other proposed contact trac-
ing apps may have similar or different security flaws 
that make them susceptible to attacks and data leaks.
 The primary study [75] described possible attacks on 
Bluetooth technology used by contact tracing apps. 
Recent Bluetooth vulnerabilities include BlueFrag 
(CVE-2020-0022 which affected Android devices 
running Android 8.0 to 9.0) and Bluetooth BIAS 
Attack (affected multiple Android and iOS devices) 
[76] were disclosed in February and May 2020 
respectively and required patching. However, many 
Android devices did not receive this update as more 
than one billion Android devices around the world 
are no longer supported by security updates, leav-
ing them potentially vulnerable to attacks. According 
to Google’s data from 2019, around 40% of Android 
active users worldwide are on version 6.0 or earlier 
and no longer receive security updates [77]. A suc-
cessful Bluetooth BIAS attack would allow a mali-
cious actor to impersonate a device from a previ-
ous secure Bluetooth connection pairing between 
two devices. This can be leveraged to conduct social 
engineering attacks or take control of the vulner-
able device as contact tracing apps always require 
Bluetooth to be enabled to function. Other possi-
ble attacks and vulnerabilities susceptible to contact 
tracing apps are described in primary studies [78–
81].
• Technical constraints—The development and roll-
out of contact tracing apps revolve around several 
assumptions that raise questions about its efficacy to 
advance public health in the fight against COVID-19. 
These assumptions are that a large percentage of the 
population have access to compatible smartphones 
and an internet connection, the application’s design, 
that Bluetooth signals are accurate, and that people 
will choose to install and use the apps [61, 68, 82].
 According to Statista, the current number of smart-
phone users in the world today is 3.5 billion, and 
this means 44.98% of the world’s population owns a 
smartphone [83]. From this percentage, smartphones 
running the Android operating system held an 87% 
share of the global market in 2019 compared to the 
mobile operating system developed by Apple (iOS), 
which had a 13% share of the market [84], thus mak-
ing Android the most popular mobile operating sys-
tem used across the world. However, more than one 
billion Android devices are 2 years or more out of 
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date and do not receive updates from device manu-
facturers and carriers. This means many Android 
devices may not benefit from updates to the new 
COVID-19 contact tracing system Google has built 
in collaboration with Apple. For example, the Trace-
Together app requires Android 5.1 or higher, while 
the CovidSafe app works on Android 6.0 or higher. 
On iOS devices, both TraceTogether and CovidSafe 
require iOS version 10 or higher [78]. Currently, most 
back-end systems and contact tracing apps are poorly 
inter-connected since they are developed by different 
government agencies, health authorities, and organi-
zations [85].
 Access to mobile internet across the world is not 
evenly distributed. According to the latest report 
from the GSMA Mobile Economy [86], smartphone 
subscriber penetration is considerably low in Sub-
Saharan Africa (45%) compared to other regions like 
Europe (86%), North America (83%), Greater China 
(82%) and Asia Pacific (60%). This disparity is closely 
related to the GDP per capita of countries where 
citizens from poorer countries are less likely to own 
a smartphone. Even in regions like Europe, not all 
households have access to mobile internet and smart-
phones. In the UK, figures released by the Office for 
National Statistics (ONS), show that a third of house-
holds still do not have access to mobile broadband 
[87]. The latest figures in 2020 show that 30% of UK 
senior citizens aged 55 years and above do not own 
or have access to a smartphone and an estimated 21% 
of young adults aged 18 years and above do not have 
a smartphone [88]. This digital divide and inequality 
mean that health care development in the form of 
contact tracing apps and related technologies rapidly 
does not become available to many people within the 
population and has the unintended but inevitable 
consequence of fuelling health inequality [89].
 Bluetooth signals suffer from accuracy problems and 
will require developers to fine-tune how signals 
will be transmitted by lowering the transmission 
power to prevent such long-distance reception. Pri-
mary study [90] highlighted different Bluetooth ver-
sions and smartphone chipset implementations that 
can result in different operational and information 
security aspects of its use for contact tracing. Signal 
strength can vary significantly depending on the rela-
tive orientation of smartphones, on absorption by the 
human body, reflection, or absorption of radio signals 
in buildings and on trains. According to the inventors 
of Bluetooth, Jaap Haartsen, and Sven Mattisson, the 
signal’s path loss will vary significantly depending on 
extenuating conditions (free space or obscured) [91]. 
Duration, proximity, and direction of signal strength 
between two devices would also need to be measured 
to deal with problems associated with false positives. 
Especially in scenarios where the contact tracing app 
detects a non-valid exposure or false negative, where 
the app fails to detect a valid exposure because the 
distance was miscalculated, or even because of other 
external factors and extenuating circumstances. The 
inevitable danger of non-valid exposure measure-
ments is linked to the risk that users are wrongly 
isolated, potentially several times in succession, with 
considerable economic and social consequences to 
those affected [15, 64]. The SARS-CoV-2 virus could 
spread by touching an object or surface with a virus 
present from an infected person, and then touch-
ing the mouth, nose, or eyes. Hence in such cases, a 
contact tracing app will not be able to detect this and 
may give people a false sense of security.
• User behaviour and participation—Most citizens over 
the age of 65 are not tech-savvy compared to the 
younger generation. Using the latest data on smart-
phone usage by age, sourced from the UK’s commu-
nications regulator OFCOM, there is a digital divide 
between adults of certain age groups and their atti-
tudes towards the use of smartphones with young 
adults more likely to use contact tracing apps com-
pared to senior citizens in the UK [89]. This intergen-
erational divide is supported by the study of partici-
pants in Singapore demonstrated in a primary study 
[92]. The success of any voluntarily installed app, 
for whatever purpose, is dependent upon user buy-
in. There are several dimensions to that judgment of 
acceptability of technology, including its benefits and 
disbenefits, the moral or social imperatives, the per-
ceived efficacy of the app, and the behaviour of sig-
nificant others in the lives of the potential user. Psy-
chological research into the adoption of technologies 
focuses on these issues, where wetware meets hard-
ware and software.
 Primary studies [93–95], highlights adoption is deter-
mined by individual risks, cultural difference and 
social preferences, not by the wider health benefits 
to society. However, primary study [96], highlighted 
that a perceived realistic threat to life or health dur-
ing the pandemic is a more important predictor of 
acceptance of contact tracing technologies in Poland. 
The study also found women were more willing to 
accept their use than men. Primary study [97] con-
cluded that it is difficult for policymakers to design 
one app that fits all individuals in a society. Especially 
when the propensity to accept such non-mandatory 
apps varies between critics, advocates, and unde-
cided individuals amongst the neo-liberal population. 
Tracking or screening technologies can work when 
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the public understands the value of them for their 
health and wellbeing, and both parties are signed up 
for that greater purpose [98]. Under such conditions, 
surveillance concerns are minimized. This is con-
firmed by primary study [95] in a qualitative, focus-
group study of participants in the U.K. Primary study 
[99] report a study of intentions to use a contact-trac-
ing app in Australia, with the conclusion that uptake 
of the software can be increased if the security con-
cerns are addressed, but that message framing did 
not make a significant difference to intention when 
autonomy-controlling and supportive messages were 
compared. Supportive messages involve choice and 
freedom, whereas autonomy-controlling messages 
use model verbs such as “should” and “must”.
Discussion from the primary studies shows an over-
whelming consensus that privacy concerns is the most 
significant reason for the lack of acceptance and use of 
contact tracing apps amongst the population in neo-lib-
eral societies. This issue is largely influenced by the cul-
tural differences in these societies, lack of evidence of 
wider health benefits of these apps and growing concerns 
that government agencies could use data collected for 
digital mass surveillance.
RQ2: what recommendations can be implemented 
to address these challenges and improve mass 
acceptance?
Based on the current challenges of contact tracing apps 
in the fight against COVID-19 in neo-liberal societies 
identified in RQ1, we discuss recommendations that can 
be applied to remedy these issues and can influence its 
wide adoption and acceptance:
• Addressing user data privacy concerns—Maintaining a 
balance especially between user privacy and societal 
benefit is a huge challenge if digital contact tracing 
using mobile apps is to succeed in the fight against 
COVID-19. Also, influencing user behaviour in the 
participation, and dealing with technical constraints 
associated with the underlying technology is essen-
tial if contact tracing apps are to succeed now and 
in respect of dealing with future pandemics. In this 
section, we discuss recommendations in addressing 
some of these issues and future considerations in the 
development and implementation of digital contact 
tracing. Data collected from such apps should only be 
used to support public health measures, the source 
code should be made public and subjected to public 
analysis and finally, its use must be voluntary, used 
with the explicit consent of the user and the systems 
must be designed to be able to be switched off, and 
all data deleted when the current pandemic is over 
[100]. There are suggestions that a non-partisan inde-
pendent committee with representatives from legal, 
health, and privacy experts should be established to 
oversee the development of contact tracing apps, its 
information ecosystem, and data governance. Only 
anonymized aggregated data should be shared with 
public health authorities and any personal identifi-
able information must be deleted once the pandemic 
is over [60, 101].
• Addressing security vulnerabilities—On issues associ-
ated with Bluetooth, it is recommended that the Blue-
tooth Low Energy (BLE) signal should be regulated in 
a standardized manner when operating a contact trac-
ing app so that the effective range of the protocol is 
reduced [90]. Legislation should be put in place which 
mandates smartphone manufacturers and carriers to 
provide critical system updates especially for Android 
devices vulnerable to critical Bluetooth vulnerabili-
ties such as BlueFrag and BIAS attack. Mitigations to 
address security vulnerabilities promptly, application 
code review and secure software development must 
be considered to minimize risk to user data [60].
• Addressing technical constraints—Proximity accuracy 
issues with Bluetooth technology has been addressed 
in the recent update of Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE). 
However, there is still room for improvement in the 
development of new protocols and refined calibra-
tion of BLE signal strength that can enhance this 
technology [59, 78, 79].
• Improving user behaviour and participation—Cur-
rently, there a few studies about the psychological 
factors that would influence the adoption of an app 
for contact tracing at present for the ongoing out-
break of COVID-19. Findings from the primary stud-
ies [93, 95], suggests that people would respond best 
to messages which alleviate their security concerns, 
emphasize personal autonomy, and where the soci-
etal benefits are clearly articulated. It is also impor-
tant that policy makers study their demographic to 
understand user perception. Designing a contact 
tracing app that targets most of the population and 
addresses their concerns (privacy and usability) can 
increase mass acceptance. Moreover, to realize their 
intended societal benefits, contact tracing apps 
require mass acceptance [97].
Our findings reveal that most of the primary studies 
consider showcasing the societal benefits of contact trac-
ing apps, addressing privacy concerns, technical con-
straints and security issues  that can influence the mass 
acceptance and use of contact tracing apps in neo-liberal 
societies.
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RQ3: what are the future directions and considerations 
in the use of digital contact tracing technologies 
in the fight against future pandemic outbreaks?
Since there are several underlying challenges of digital 
contact tracing apps in the light of their relevance in the 
fight against the COVID-19 pandemic, many of the issues 
are inherited from mobile applications as well. Our study 
shows that user privacy concerns are the most pressing 
challenge identified by most of the studies in their analy-
sis of the implications of contact tracing apps, especially 
for neo-liberal societies. One of the positives of these 
apps is their ability to track and trace the spread of the 
infection in real-time whilst complementing other man-
ual contact tracing methods. Despite these, for contact 
tracing apps to be effective, a large number of the pop-
ulation would need to install and use these apps. Based 
on the outcome of this SLR and our findings, we present 
the following future considerations and directions for 
contact tracing apps and related technologies in the fight 
against COVID-19 and future pandemic outbreaks that 
are worth investigating and implementing to encourage 
willingness and mass adoption by the wider population:
• Adopting less-invasive and privacy-preserving technol-
ogies—For future considerations, the use of less-inva-
sive technologies such as Artificial Intelligence (AI) 
and Machine Learning (ML) has been proposed to 
help analyse the level of infection by the SARS-CoV-2 
virus by identifying hotspots, tracing, and monitor-
ing infected persons as described in primary studies 
[42, 78, 102–109]. Other methods described in the 
primary study [110, 111], propose the use of thermal-
based imaging using the Internet of Medical Things 
(IoMT) and other Internet of Things (IoT) devices 
[112, 113] to trace and track positive cases and help 
control the spread of COVID-19 infection and future 
infectious disease outbreaks. The use of a privacy-
preserving contact tracing scheme in blockchain-
based medical applications has also been proposed 
[114, 115].
• Transparency—To encourage the willingness to adopt 
and use contact tracing apps, policymakers, devel-
opers, governments, and public health authorities in 
neo-liberal societies must adopt a feedback mecha-
nism during the phases of deployment to create 
public confidence, trust and participation. Citizens 
deserve clarity on the purpose of data collection, 
types of data collected, who has access to such data, 
the modalities, extent and timeline for data deletion 
[35, 58, 59, 71, 78, 94, 116].
• Influencing human behaviour—It is important to study 
human behaviour when designing and developing 
contact tracing apps and related digital technolo-
gies before deploying and integrating them amongst 
the population. This includes studying a significant 
amount of theories and models such as the technol-
ogy acceptance model, innovation diffusion theory, 
the theory of reasoned action, health belief models 
and theory of planned behaviour, social cognitive 
theory, and motivation theory can be used to explore 
the acceptance and use of future contact tracing 
technologies [85, 94].
• Ethical considerations—For government, technol-
ogy developers, decision-makers and public health 
authorities, there is the need to translate the ethical–
legal considerations into actionable safeguards that 
can unlock the promise of contact tracing apps and 
related digital technologies while avoiding harm and 
managing risks in the fight against future pandemics 
[71].
Based on the results of this survey and our observa-
tions, digital technologies can be used to support manual 
contact tracing and tracking methods in the fight against 
COVID-19 and future pandemic outbreaks. However, 
neo-liberal governments and public health authorities 
should consider the use of alternative technologies that 
do not invade user privacy. They also need to be trans-
parent with the public on how any data collected will 
be used. Strategies and incentives to influence user par-
ticipation should also be considered well in advance 
to encourage mass acceptance amongst the wider 
population.
Conclusion and future work
The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic represents an 
unprecedented challenge to public health authorities 
and respective governments across the world. This has 
brought severe pressure on health services and intro-
duced radical changes to the way of life for both individu-
als and organizations. In a way to stop the infection of the 
SARS-CoV-2 virus from spreading, public health authori-
ties have considered and introduced robust contact 
tracing systems which include the use of digital contact 
tracing apps. In this paper, we discussed the mandatory 
application of contact tracing apps in East Asia in con-
taining the spread of the SARS-CoV-2 virus and the chal-
lenges faced by neo-liberal societies in their use to fight 
against the COVID-19 pandemic. Although contact trac-
ing apps are a promising technology for rapid tracing and 
tracking of infected persons, they can support manual 
contact tracing and tracking methods in the control of 
the SARS-CoV-2 virus. However, many people have an 
intrinsic mistrust of the government especially in neo-
liberal societies and are concerned that the use of contact 
tracing apps could be the beginning of more pervasive 
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government surveillance. Also, since these apps are not 
mandatory, it is difficult to predict mass acceptance and 
participation. If contact tracing apps are to succeed, it is 
important governments and policymakers gain the trust 
of their citizens and show adequate transparency in how 
user data is collected and used. Its efficacy and how these 
challenges are currently addressed in the fight against this 
novel disease will determine the role of digital contact 
tracing technologies in future pandemic outbreaks and 
what lessons can be learned from identified inadequacies.
Future potential research agenda concerning the 
impact and effectiveness of contact tracing apps and 
related technologies in neo-liberal societies needs to the 
considered. Studies that evaluate the effectiveness of the 
recommendations implemented by various policymak-
ers, governments, and public health authorities to verify 
whether they influence the willingness and mass accept-
ance of this technology also needs to be carried out.
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